We consider an adverse selection model in which the agent can gather private information before the principal offers the contract. There are two scenarios. In scenario I, information gathering is a hidden action, while in scenario II, the principal observes the agent's information gathering decision. We study how the two scenarios differ with respect to the agent's expected rent, the principal's expected profit, and the expected total surplus. In particular, it turns out that the principal may be better off when the agent's information gathering decision is a hidden action.
Introduction
Agency models with precontractual private information play a central role in contract theory. 1 While in standard adverse selection models the information structure is exogenously given, more recently some authors have accounted for endogenous information structures. 2 The contributions to the literature on information gathering differ in several respects. In particular, some authors (e.g., Kessler 1998) assume that the information gathering decision is observable, while others (e.g., Crémer, Khalil, and Rochet, 1998) assume that it is a hidden action. Hence, it is interesting to investigate the effects of observability of information acquisition in a unified framework.
Is the agent better off if information gathering is a hidden action? Is the principal better off if she can observe whether the agent has gathered private information?
In Section 2, we introduce a simple adverse selection model in which costly information gathering before the contract is offered may be pursed for rent seeking purposes only, since it is commonly known that it is always ex post efficient to trade. 3 We consider two scenarios. In the first scenario (Section 3), the principal cannot observe whether the agent has spent resources to gather information. In the second scenario (Section 4), the principal can observe the agent's information gathering decision. In Section 5, we analyze how the agent's expected rent, the principal's expected profit, and the expected total surplus differ between the two scenarios.
The model
Consider a principal and an agent, both of whom are risk-neutral. The principal wants the agent to produce the quantity  ∈ [0 1] of a specific good. The principal's return is  and the agent's production costs are .
At date 0, nature draws the cost parameter . While both parties know that the distribution of  ∈ {     } is given by  = { =   }, at date 0 no one knows the realization of . At date 1, the agent decides whether ( = 1) or not ( = 0) he wants 1 See the seminal contributions by Myerson (1981) , Baron and Myerson (1982) , and Maskin and Riley (1984) .
2 For a survey, see Bergemann and Välimäki (2006) . 3 Information gathering is also a strategic rent-seeking activity in Khalil (1992, 1994) and Crémer, Khalil, and Rochet (1998) . While Crémer and Khalil (1994) , Rochet (1998), and Kessler (1998) also assume that information gathering can occur before the contract is offered, some authors have studied models in which information gathering can occur after the contract is offered but before it is accepted (see Khalil, 1992 and Hoppe and Schmitz, 2010) . Note that in the latter case observability of information gathering is irrelevant.
to incur information gathering costs   0 to privately learn the realization of his production costs. 4 At date 2, the principal offers a contract to the agent. At date 3, the agent decides whether to reject the contract (so that the principal's payoff is 0 and the agent's payoff is −) or whether to accept it. If the agent accepts the contract, at date 4 production takes place and the principal makes the contractually specified transfer payment  to the agent. Then the principal's payoff is  −  and the agent's payoff is  −  − .
We assume that        . Thus, it is common knowledge that  = 1 is the first-best trade level, regardless of the state of nature. This implies that costly information gathering is an unproductive rent-seeking activity only.
We will compare two scenarios. In scenario I, the principal cannot observe the agent's information gathering decision . In contrast, in scenario II the principal observes the agent's decision  (while she can never observe the realization of ).
Scenario I
In scenario I, the principal cannot observe whether the agent has gathered information. Let  ∈ [0 1] denote the probability with which the agent gathers information at date 1.
Consider first the principal's contract offer. Suppose the principal believes the agent has gathered information with probability . According to the revelation principle, the principal can confine her attention to direct mechanisms
subject to the incentive compatibility constraints
We thus consider the same information gathering technology as Khalil (1992, 1994) and Crémer, Khalil, and Rochet (1998) . In contrast, Kessler (1998) studies a model in which the agent chooses information gathering expenditures that determine the probability with which he becomes informed.
the participation constraints
and the feasibility constraints
Observe that the participation constraint (   ) of the low-cost type is redundant, as it is implied by (  ) and (   ). Similarly, the participation constraint (   ) is redundant because it is implied by (  ) and (   ). Moreover, note that the incentive compatibility constraints (  ) and (  ) imply the monotonicity constraint
Ignore for a moment the incentive compatibility constraints (  ), (  ), and (  ), which will turn out to be satisfied by our solution. It is then easy to see that (   ) must be binding; i.e., it is optimal for the principal to set
because otherwise we could increase the principal's expected profit by decreasing   without violating any of the remaining constraints. Furthermore, (  ) must be binding, so that it is optimal for the principal to set
because otherwise she could decrease   without violating any of the remaining constraints. Observe that (2) and (3) together with the monotonicity constraint   ≥   imply that the right-hand side of (  ) is larger than the right-hand side of (  ).
Thus, it is optimal for the principal to set
so that (  ) is binding. It is straightforward to check that the omitted constraints (  ), (  ), and (  ) are indeed satisfied if (2), (3), (4), and
Hence, the principal's problem can be simplified. She chooses
, and   ∈ [0 1] in order to maximize her expected profit
subject to the monotonicity constraint
The payments   ,   , and   are given by (2), (3), and (4).
To solve the simplified problem, note that it is optimal for the principal to set
Note that 0 ()  1. The coefficient of   is strictly positive whenever
Hence, it is easy to verify that in order to maximize her expected profit (5) subject to the monotonicity constraint (6), the principal sets   and   as displayed in Table 1 . Consider now the agent's behavior. Suppose first that in equilibrium the agent always gathers information, so that  = 1 (). Then according to Table 1 , the principal would set   =   =: . Yet, if the agent always gathers information, his expected payoff would then be given by
while his expected payoff would be
information. Hence,  = 1 cannot be part of an equilibrium.
Suppose next the agent never gathers information, so that
and  (), so that according to Table 1 the principal would set
while his expected payoff if he does not gather information is
then  = 0 cannot be part of an equilibrium.
, then in equilibrium the agent gathers information with probability  ∈ (0 1). This means that the agent must be indifferent between gathering and not gathering information, so that
must hold, which using (2), (3), and (4) simplifies to
Observe that (9) is equivalent to Table 1 shows
Hence, in these cases the equilibrium conditions cannot be satisfied, so that there are only three cases left.
• If  =() (), the principal sets   = 0 and
• If  =() =(), there are multiple equilibria. Specifically, the principal
Since the principal makes the same expected profit in all these equilibria, we assume that she offers the contract that is the best one for the agent, which is
Note that there exists a cut-off value, which is defined by() =(). 5 Proposition 1 Consider scenario I.
, then in equilibrium the agent does not gather information, the principal's expected profit is  − [], and the agent's expected rent is 0.
, there are two cases. If  , the agent gathers information with probability(), the principal's expected profit is()( −   ), and the agent's expected rent is 0. If  ≥, the agent gathers information with probability(), the principal's expected profit is  −   , and the agent's expected rent is
5 It is straightforward to check that() is strictly increasing in , while() is strictly decreasing. Moreover,(  ) (  ) and lim →∞ () = 0. Hence, there exists a unique    such that () () whenever  , while() () whenever  .
Scenario II
In scenario II, the principal can observe whether at date 1 the agent has invested  in information gathering. Suppose first the agent has not gathered information. Then at date 2 the principal offers the contract   = 1,   = [], which the uninformed agent accepts since his expected production costs are covered. Thus, the principal obtains the expected first-best surplus  − [], while the agent's expected payoff is zero.
Next, suppose that the agent has gathered information. When the principal offers the contract, she knows that the agent has private information about his costs, so that she faces a standard adverse selection problem. The principal offers the menu
As is well known (see e.g. Laffont and Martimort, 2002) , only the incentive compatibility constraint of the low-cost type and the participation constraint of the high-cost type are binding, so that it is optimal for the principal to set 
Comparison of the scenarios
We now analyze how the observability of information gathering affects the principal's expected profit, the agent's expected rent, and the expected total surplus. Propositions 1 and 2 imply the following result, which is illustrated in Figure 1 . 6 6 One can check that() (), so that  must hold. (iv) Otherwise, the principal extracts the first-best expected total surplus in both scenarios.
As one might have expected, the principal is typically (weakly) better off if she can observe the agent's information gathering decision. Yet, there are also circumstances under which observability of information gathering reduces the principal's expected profit. This happens if the return  is sufficiently large and the information gathering costs  are at an intermediate level.
For large values of , the principal has a strong interest to trade. Hence, when she observes that the agent is informed, she will make an offer that the agent accepts regardless of his type. Thus, if information gathering is observable, then from the agent's point of view information gathering has the additional advantage that it can influence the principal's offer, which is not the case if it is unobservable. Hence, for intermediate values of the information gathering costs , the agent still gathers information when it is observable, while he remains uninformed when information gathering is unobservable. As a consequence, when  is large and  is at an intermediate level, the principal must leave an information rent to the agent when information gathering is observable, while she can extract the expected first-best surplus from the uninformed agent when information gathering is unobservable. 7 7 The result that observability of information gathering may reduce the principal's expected profit and increase the agent's expected rent may also hold in a model with more than two states. For 
Supplementary material:
An example with three types (cf. footnote 7 of the paper)
The model
We consider the same model as in the paper except that now there are three different cost types. Specifically, we assume that the distribution of  ∈ {        } is given by   = { =   } and   = { =   }
Scenario I: Unobservable information gathering
Suppose the principal believes that the agent has gathered information with probability . Again we use direct mechanisms to solve the principal's problem; i.e. she maximizes her expected payoff
Solving this optimization problem leads to tedious case distinctions. However, consider the following example:
Observe that the participation constraint (   ) of the low-cost type is redundant, as it is implied by (  ) and (   ). Similarly, the participation constraint (   ) is redundant because it is implied by (  ) and (   ) The participation constraint (   ) which is implied by (  ) and (   ) is redundant as well. Moreover, note that the incentive compatibility constraints (  ) and (  ) imply the monotonicity constraint
Now ignore for a moment the incentive compatibility constraints (  ), (  ), (  ), and (  ), (  ) as well as (  ) which will turn out to be satisfied by our solution. It is then easy to see that (   ) must be binding; i.e., it is optimal for the principal to set
because otherwise she could increase her expected profit by decreasing   without violating any of the remaining constraints. Furthermore, (  ) must be binding, so that it is optimal for the principal to set
because otherwise she could decrease   without violating any of the remaining constraints. Observe that (2) and (3) together with the monotonicity constraint   ≥   imply that in our example the right-hand side of (  ) is larger than the right-hand side of (  ). Thus, it is optimal for the principal to set
so that (  ) is binding. Similarly, (2), (3), and (4) together with the monotonicity constraint   ≥   ≥   imply that the right-hand side of (  ) is larger than both the right-hand side of (  ) and the right-hand side of (  ). Thus, it is optimal for the principal to set
so that (  ) is binding. Hence, the principal's problem can be simplified. She chooses
The payments   ,   ,   , and   are given by (2), (3), (4), and (5).
To solve the simplified problem, note first that it is optimal for the principal to set   = 1 (since   ( −   ) ≥ 0). Moreover, it is straightforward to show that the principal also sets   = 1
1 Now consider the principal's choice of    Note that the coefficient of   is strictly positive if
Thus, the princial sets
Finally consider the choice of   . The principal sets   = 1 if the coefficient of   is strictly positive; i.e. if
If the coefficient of   is strictly negative, she sets   = 0 while she sets   ∈ [0 1] if the coefficient of   is equal to zero ( =()).
3 Hence, the solution of the principal's maximization problem is given by   =   = 1,
if  () and 1 Specifically, she chooses   = 1 if the coefficient of   is positive. If the coefficient of   is negative, then due to the monotonicity constraint   ≤   she sets   = 1 whenever the sum of the coefficient of   and the coefficient of   is positive; i.e. whenever
 Given our example, this condition is always satisfied.
2 If the coefficient of   is strictly negative, then due to the monotonicity constraint   ≤   the principal would generally set   = 1 whenever the sum of the coefficient of   and the coefficient of   is positive; i.e. whenever  () :=
Obviously, in our example this condition is more restrictive than the condition  () Hence, in our example the principal sets   = 0 if the coefficient of   is strictly negative ( ()). Moreover, she sets   ∈ [0 1] if the coefficient of   is equal to zero ( =()).
3 Note that the monotonicity constraint   ≤   is always satisfied since in the examplẽ
It is straightforward to check that the omitted constraints (  ), (  ), (  ), and (  ) (  ) as well as (  ) are indeed satisfied by the solution. Consider now the agent's behavior. Suppose first that in equilibrium the agent always gathers information, so that  = 1 () (). Then the principal sets , 46, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 46] . Given that the principal will offer this menu, the agent does not gather information such that the principal extracts the expected first-best surplus, which is 54.
Scenario II: Observable information gathering
Suppose first that the principal observes that the agent has not gathered information. Then at date 2 she offers the contract   = 1,   = [], which the uninformed agent accepts since his expected production costs are covered. Thus, the principal obtains the expected first-best surplus  − [], while the agent's expected payoff is zero.
Next, suppose that the principal observes that the agent has gathered private information; i.e. she faces a standard adverse selection problem. 
